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Your Schedule and Talking Points for Your
Meetings with the Japanese Leaders

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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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State Dept. review completed

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You will be met at the airport by:

From Japan-US Economic Council:

Yoshizane Iwasa, Chairman of Fuji Bank Ltd and
Chairman of JUSEC

Masahisa Segawa, Iwasa's personal secretary

From Foreign Ministry:

Bunroku Yoshino, Director General - American Affairs

Mr. Fukada, Yoshino's Staff

Mr. Hogen, Yoshino's Staff

From U. S. Embassy:

Robert Ingersoll, Ambassador

Richard L. Sneider, DCM

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Japan - U. S. Economic Council

This is a blue ribbon list of Japanese business leaders, but few of them will have an adequate command of English. Essentially conservative in political outlook (they fund the LDP), they will be as worried and concerned about the state of U. S. - Japan relations and about their future role in the world as any of the politicians. They are generally fairly close-mouthed about what transpires at their meetings. However, Mr. Iwasa shows signs of wanting to use his chairmanship of the Japan-U. S. Economic Council as a means of gaining ascendancy over Mr. Uemura, President of Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations, which is roughly the equivalent of our National Association of Manufacturers), and others to become the leading international spokesman for Japanese business. As your host, he will doubtless seek as much publicity from this meeting as he can. The expanding overseas operations of Japanese trade and industry is forcing business leaders such as those represented in this group to take an active interest in foreign policy in its political and security aspects as well as its international economics. This group will therefore probably prefer to hear you discuss political and security matters, and will not expect you to reflect an intimate knowledge of world economic problems. You may be as frank with this group on the great international issues as you are with any of the leaders but Sato and Fukuda.

Suggested Talking Points

- Outline your views on the emerging multipolar system in Asia, and what this means for the prospect for peace and stability in the region.
- Describe in what ways Japan might related to this changing international context.
- Reassure the group that the U. S. continues to attach the highest value to its alliance with Japan, intends to stand by

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its defense commitment to Japan, and sees no contradiction between these intentions and the U. S. effort to improve relations with the PRC.

- Explain that the U. S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is aimed at making our alliance more sustainable over the long term, and is in no way a subterfuge for pressing Japan to stand alone on its own.
- Reassure the group that the U. S. intends to continue to play a vital balancing role in Asia, and will maintain the mix of ground, naval, and air forces in the area necessary to make that role effective.
- Express awareness of Japan's past efforts to liberalize its trading practices. Emphasize, however, the seriousness with which the U. S. views its continuing trade deficit -- especially that with Japan -- and encourage the Japanese business leaders to generate greater levels of imports from the U. S. through both governmental and private efforts.
- Refer to the upcoming (June 15-17) meeting between Mr. Iwasa's Economic Council and its U. S. counterpart, the Advisory

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Council on Japan - U. S. Economic Relations (headed by Jeeb Halaby), and urge the Japanese to listen carefully to what the U. S. business leaders say.

- Express an interest in the timing of the recovery of Japan from its business slowdown, and suggest that the measures taken to expand the Japanese economy be calculated in such a way as to generate a greater demand for U. S. goods.
- Urge Japan to take concrete steps to implement the seven-point program announced on May 20, and insist that Japan must take the steps necessary to remove its restrictions on foreign trade and investment and to moderate the continued rapid rise in its exports.

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HAK STATEMENT BEFORE JAPAN-US ECONOMIC COUNCIL

A Changed World

-- It is a great privilege to be here in Japan. I appreciate the opportunity to come that JUSEC has provided, and the chance to meet your Board of Directors. The Japanese members of this organization have made a major contribution to this country's astonishing economic growth in recent years.

-- I was last in Japan in 1963, and the changes which have taken place since then must be seen to be believed.

-- These changes in Japan illustrate a point I would like to make: the world itself has changed greatly from what it was a generation ago.

-- Japan and Western Europe have recovered fully from World War II and have gone on to new economic heights. Among the countries of Western Europe a new degree of political accord has also been achieved.

-- Dozens of new countries have gained independence and dignity and are making their mark upon the world stage.

-- The so-called "socialist camp" has fragmented. The time has long past when we can think of it as a monolithic bloc.

-- The military equations in the world have altered. All-out war is unthinkable and meaningful arms control measures now serve to enhance national security.

-- The relationships among the great powers have become much more fluid, and the cold war to some extent less intense. Instead of a situation

of confrontation between two powers or blocs, there are now multipolar centers of power and influence.

-- U. S. foreign policy under the Nixon Administration has changed to reflect this changed world. And we attach no higher priority to any task than that of reshaping and strengthening our traditional bonds with Japan.

-- We see Japan in the process of defining its own role in this multipolar world, and its relationship to each of its elements. It has a crucial economic and political role to play in this multipolar world. It is only natural that you carefully scrutinize the policies which you have followed in the past to see if these still are valid in terms of Japanese national interest.

-- One central element that I am confident that both of us recognize must endure is the strong US-Japan partnership.

US Approach to Japan in a Multipolar World

-- This leads us to U. S. foreign policy in recent months. I know that many Japanese are wondering about moves which we have made -- the President's visits to Peking and Moscow, the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, Vietnamization, the SALT Agreement, the New Economic Policy, and others. We are not insensitive to the fact that in Japan there has indeed been something called the "Nixon shoku."

-- You are asking: Where does Japan stand in all this? Is the U. S. turning away from its alliance with Japan? Or is the U. S. trying to push Japan into doing things or shouldering responsibilities of a regional or global nature which the U. S. now wants to avoid? Does the U. S. attach more value to reaching agreements with Moscow and Peking than to maintaining its close and friendly ties with Japan? Does Japan really count in U. S. calculations? Is the U. S. in effect getting out of Asia? Should Japan in return strike off in new directions of its own?

-- As a general response to these questions, I want to state flatly that the U. S. places the highest premium on its relationship with Japan. In President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report of February 9, 1972, he said:

. "Japan is our most important ally in Asia. It is our second greatest trading partner. It is an essential participant, if a stable world peace is to be built. Our security, our prosperity, and our global policies are therefore intimately and inextricably linked to the U.S.-Japanese relationship. The well-being of both countries requires cooperation and a shared commitment to the same fundamental goals."

-- In this connection the U. S. highly values the Mutual Security Treaty between our two nations.

-- The President, his Administration and the American people strongly believe in these factors.

-- To put the whole question of Japanese-U. S. relations into better perspective, let me talk about the kinds of basic relationships which we find it necessary, or desirable, to maintain in the world today.

. First, those derived from a close mutuality of interest, or upon similarities in philosophy or outlook. In this category I would place U. S. relations with Japan, with our neighbors in North and South America, with the NATO countries, and with other countries to which we are tied by bilateral or multilateral treaties. With such nations the central theme of our relationship is interdependence.

. Second, those with countries having profoundly different political and social systems from our own, but with which we must deal realistically if our goal of building a peaceful world order is to be achieved. In this category are such countries as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Although we have had serious disputes with such nations, the demands of peace obligate us to find areas where our interests overlap and where relaxation of tensions may be achieved. We hope for increasing cooperation with these countries but with them we are at the beginning of a process.

. Third, countries with whom we have a more peripheral relationship, but where we also wish to maintain friendly relations.

-- The point to be stressed concerning Japanese-U.S. relations is that in seeking out areas of agreement with the countries in the second category, we will not sacrifice our close bonds with countries in the first category. It would be fatuous to think that we could make the PRC or the USSR more amenable by turning away from our friends and allies, even if we wanted to -- which we don't. We can better advance the cause of peace in our dealings with potential adversaries when they see that we are reliable partners and we respect our friends.

-- We believe it is in the national interests of the U. S. and Japan for our two countries to remain close friends. We also believe it is in the national interests of the U. S., as well as of Japan, for the U. S. to seek a relaxation of tensions with the PRC and the USSR and move on to increased cooperation, if possible. There is no clash of interests here.

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Japanese Questions

- Having said this, let me return to the more specific questions which have arisen in the minds of the Japanese people about the constancy and reliability of the U.S. in its dealings with Japan.
- I believe the most useful discussions that I can have with you and the other leaders of Japan this week is on the future of U.S. - Japanese relations rather than dwelling on past events. This, I hope, will be the focus of my talks here -- how our two countries see the international scene and Asia in particular; how we see the Japanese and American roles in this context; and what we think the shape of the US-Japan partnership should be.
- Nevertheless, we must candidly recognize that in the fast changing international patterns of recent months, some misunderstandings have developed in our bilateral relations. I believe the fact that such ripples have occurred should not greatly surprise us at a time when the world has changed so much and the places of your country and mine have changed in that world. But let us first deal briefly with some of the problems that I know many Japanese have raised head-on so that we can then move to a more constructive discussion of future vistas.
- Rather than go over a long check-list of what I understand are Japanese grievances, I would like to address three major areas of concern:

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-- The "Nixon shock" (or "shoku"), that is, the abrupt way that two major policy decisions were announced by the U.S. with very little advance notice to Japan.

- We regretted the necessity of acting the way we did, but in both instances we believed that the sensitive nature of these moves made it impossible to provide prior consultations to any of our friends and allies.

- These were special cases and clearly not part of a pattern.

-- The related concept that political and economic considerations in Japan are simply not given much weight in U.S. policy determinations.

- Admittedly, there have been political and economic repercussions in Japan over moves such as the President's China initiative, the NEP, the textile issue, and the Chirep vote in the UN last fall.
- I've already talked about the President's July 15 and August 15 ^{as} announcements /special cases. Since then we have consulted closely on both China policy and economic issues. On the NEP, we are working closely with Japan on world monetary reform and trade liberalization. There are still differences in our points of view, but these hopefully can be handled with good intentions and mutual respect for each other's interests.
- On the textiles issue, let's hope that it remains a closed book. There were problems in it for us, too. With respect to the UN

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issue, we had no reason to believe that our approach wouldn't work. We thought it was fair and realistic. And I was assured by the experts before my Peking trip last year that the vote would not possibly take place before well after my departure from Peking.

- In any event, as the San Clemente meetings last January on Okinawan reversion showed, we are certainly taking Japanese internal considerations very heavily into our calculations. We are maintaining the closest consultations with Japanese leaders both here and in Washington.

- Ambassador Ingersoll has the full confidence of President Nixon and this is one of his primary tasks. It is also one of the major purposes of my trip here.

-- The thought that the U.S. is pulling out of Asia and in some way is attempting to get Japan to replace us in a balance of power role.

- The U.S. is emphatically not pulling out of Asia. We intend to stay on and to fulfill our commitments, and will maintain the military forces required to do so.
- We are not trying to push Japan into anything. We believe that what the Japanese do will be in terms of their own judgment of their national interests.
- We are not seeking, either, to see a perpetuation of the classic 19th century balance of power situation. What we hope will

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eventually emerge is a world order without blocs and with countries treating one another as equals.

Agenda for the Future

-- I hope that we can make some headway on such concerns in our discussions. But in all candor, explanations and reassurances and promises of consultation by both sides -- though important -- will not suffice to place our partnership on a sound footing. Only a constructive discussion of where we go from here and then the process of joint action will serve to maintain and enrich our traditional close ties.

-- There are many pressing international problems that the U.S. and Japan -- and in most cases Europe -- not only can talk about, but must talk about. It is not so much that they offer opportunities for cooperative action as they demand it. We must begin to talk creatively and act more in harmony about an imposing agenda of issues:

- Trade: How do we work out new relationships so that the commercial exchanges between our countries, and those of Western Europe, enrich our political cooperation, rather than jeopardize it?
- International Monetary Reform: How do we and the Europeans shape a new global system that reflects new monetary realities?

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- Economic Assistance: What should be the role and the share of economic assistance by various developed countries to developing ones?
- The Environment: How do we share our knowledge so that we can help each other clean up our environment and together help to cleanse the world's?
- Energy: How are we going to fill the growing needs for energy to fuel our societies?
- Technological Cooperation: The advanced nations have a great deal to share in the fields of science and technology, whether it be in addressing problems here on earth or seeking new horizons in outer space.

-- These and other challenges constitute a constructive agenda for our two countries. They point to an enduring relationship that Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon referred to last January in San Clemente. As they put it, over a hundred years of association between our two countries must be continued on the foundation of mutual trust and interdependence.

-- I have only touched the tip of the iceberg. But let me stop now and take your questions and comments. For I have come to Japan more to listen than to explain.

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Komeito Party Chairman Takeiri

and

Democratic Socialist Party Chairman Kasuga

You may encounter these two opposition party leaders at the reception on June 10. You have met both within the past half year: Kasuga when he called on you December 3, and Takeiri when he met with you March 15.

The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which was formed in 1960 when its members split from the Socialist Party on the issue of political extremism and which now has 32 members in the 486-member Lower House of the Diet, is the only opposition party that supports the U.S.-Japan alliance. Kasuga, who took the DSP over last fall, is regarded as a controversial head of a party split between those like himself who feel the DSP should work for unity with the other opposition parties even if it means sacrificing the traditionally more moderate stance, and the party's moderate wing.

The Komeito Party, Japan's third largest, is the political arm of the militant Buddhist sect Soka Gakkai. It is based primarily on the urban displaced, and, while it grew rapidly during its earlier stages of organization, has shown little additional expansion in recent years. Takeiri is a clever leader, but his Party is, despite its disavowals, closely bound and subordinate to the Soka Gakkai.

Both Kasuga and Takeiri have travelled to Peking since you saw them last, and Takeiri in addition is just now returning from a visit to Pyongyang, where he met with Kim Il-song.

Suggested Talking Points

-- You might invite both Kasuga and Takeiri's observations on their recent visits to the PRC.

-- You might ask Takeiri for his comments on the political atmosphere in Pyongyang, and what impression he gained as to North Korea's current foreign policy direction.

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Prime Minister Eisaku Sato

Sato is not altogether predictable as a conversationalist. Usually forthcoming, he can at times prove taciturn. He will probably seek to maintain your conversation on a fairly elevated plane, avoiding details on any specific subject. We understand he has asked to see you alone. This does not mean he will automatically regard all aspects of your conversation as secret. On the contrary, he will feel that something newsworthy must come of it, and he will at a minimum feel he must share the substance of your talk with his principal associates. Therefore, you should reach an agreement before the meeting ends on what is privileged, what may be discussed with colleagues on a confidential basis, and what will be said to the press.

1. China. Sato's principal substantive interest will focus primarily on China policy, how we envisage the development of our relationship with Peking, what our intentions are toward Taiwan, and what transpired during the President's visit to Peking. He will want to obtain a feeling for what it is like to deal directly with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung and for the general atmospherics of Peking. He will be particularly concerned to hear from you whether the conversations in Peking included any mention of matters of great concern to Japan, such as the Senkakus problem, the U.S. - Japan security relationship, Chinese fears of Japanese militarism, and Chinese attitudes toward dealing with the Japanese government.

-- Express regret (this word is important -- it implies no blame, but rather an understanding of their problem) that our need for secrecy did not permit us to consult with the Japanese before the July 15 announcement, and our understanding of the political problems the China issue has caused Sato and his supporters.

-- Assure Sato that our China initiative is not an attempt to play Japan and China off against each other in balance of power

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politics, and that we are in no way trading our alliance with Japan off against a hope for a limited improvement in relations with China.

- Assure him we wish to avoid conflict in our approaches to Peking and intend to consult closely on future steps and developments.
- Assure him that no deals were reached on the Senkakus, offshore oil, security issues, or any other subject of concern to Japan, and that we will not take any actions to undercut Japan's vital interests.
- Explain the Shanghai Communique, especially the sections on Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.
- Describe the atmospherics of Peking, and emphasize the need for firmness in dealing with PRC leaders. (We suspect that Sato's repeated entreaties to Peking for direct official contacts, while perhaps useful to him in Japanese domestic politics, have increased PRC leverage on him.)
- Draw him out on the status of Japan's efforts to establish contacts with Peking, the results of Miki's recent visit there, and Japan's intentions.

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-- Indicate that while you recognize the importance of China policy to Japan, particularly at this point, and while we fully intend to consult closely on this question, you believe that we must not allow China to obscure other important aspects of our relations.

2. Soviet Affairs. Sato will be particularly interested in a final run-down of the Moscow trip.

-- Brief him to the fullest extent possible on the President's Moscow trip and on the agreements reached there.

-- Give him your assessment of Moscow's intentions regarding regional security arrangements, in both Europe and Asia.

-- Give Sato your assessment of Sino-Soviet relations.

-- Draw him out on his own estimate of the prospects for negotiations for a Peace Treaty with the Soviets this fall, for settlement of the Northern Territories issue, and for conclusion of a loan agreement to finance the pipeline from the Tyumen oil field to the Pacific Coast. If asked, tell Sato the U.S. Government has put no obstacles in the path of private American participation in the Tyumen oil project and some U.S. oil companies and construction firms are in contact with their Japanese counterparts.

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3. Korea. Given Japan's security and economic stake in the Korean Peninsula, Sato will be interested first, in the U.S.'s continued avowal of its defense commitment to and intention to maintain a troop presence in South Korea; second, in our assessment of the tentative moves by Seoul and Pyongyang toward some modus vivendi on the Peninsula; third, in how we plan to approach the Korean question in next fall's U.N. General Assembly; and, fourth, in our views on Japan's increasing contacts with North Korea and our plans for any possible contacts with the North.

- We will stand behind our defense commitment to the ROK, and do not intend to reduce our forces there further in the foreseeable future.
- We will support the efforts of the ROK to seek a relaxation of tensions and increased communication on the Korean Peninsula.
- We welcome the direct discussion between North and South Korea as what we hope will be the beginning of a long-term process of relaxation of tensions between the two.
- We believe it is too early to conclude that Pyongyang has firmly committed itself to long-term peaceful accommodation with Seoul, and it is necessary to know to what extent Peking and Moscow can and will restrain Pyongyang. Therefore, we should move cautiously.
- We should also avoid those moves that could seriously undermine political cohesion in South Korea, or could help Pyongyang

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drive wedges between South Korea, Japan and the U.S.

-- We are presently exploring strategy and tactics on the Korean question in next fall's U.N. General Assembly, and are coordinating with ROK, Japan and others. Postponement of the question this year as last would have the advantage of not undercutting the Seoul-Pyongyang talks and injecting another irritant into our relations with Peking and Moscow. But we must also consider fallback positions.

4. Vietnam and the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty. The use of U.S. bases in Japan to repair and supply materiel intended for the GVN forces, and the recent dispatch of a Marine air wing from Iwakuni to Vietnam has given the political opposition in Japan an opportunity to attempt to embarrass the government for its support of our Vietnam effort, focussing particularly on the "prior consultation" provisions of our Security Treaty with Japan.

-- Express appreciation for the understanding and support of his government for our efforts in Vietnam over the years, and particularly following the President's May 8 speech.

-- Express gratitude for the Japanese Government's cooperation in the use of bases in Japan in indirect support of our operations in Vietnam during the current North Vietnamese offensive. (This should be expressed privately to Sato and Fukuda only.)

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- If Sato raises the question of prior consultation on U.S. use of bases in Japan, you should assure him that the U.S. will not take any action regarding the Vietnam conflict that would require prior consultation, and that we will continue to inform his government in advance of any significant movements that might affect U.S. units in Japan. If asked about reviewing prior consultation arrangements, you should say that we should think carefully before making substantial changes in a system that has worked so well for so long.
- Give him your estimate of the military and political situation in the South and the ability of the North Vietnamese to maintain the level of their offensive, and explain the necessity for the moves which the President announced on May 8 against North Vietnam.
- Give him your estimate of the roles played by the Soviets and Chinese in this action.

5. The Multipolar World. If there are Japanese who envisage a major and much more independent role for Japan in a world dominated by four or five more or less separate power centers, Sato is not among them. He professes publicly to be puzzled about what role Japan might play, or what role the U.S. might expect Japan to play, and he and most Japanese still have the feeling that Japan's future would best be assured by continuing a close association with the United States in which Japan would enjoy most of the forms of equality and a fair degree of flexibility but in which it would in fact remain clearly the junior partner.

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- Describe in general terms how you see the multipolar world emerging over the next decade, stressing Asia. What we hope to see is a relationship of equals, and not the perpetuation of traditional balance of power concepts.
- Reassure Sato that the U. S. fully intends to play an effective role as a power in Asia and the Pacific over the long term, and that we will maintain the mix of ground, naval, and air force necessary to do this.
- Use this as an opportunity to assure Sato of the importance we place on maintaining our close ties with Japan, and that we will not sacrifice our essential relationship with Japan for other goals.
- Explain that the U. S. interest in adjusting the basic relationship with Japan toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is aimed at putting our alliance on a more sustainable basis over the long term.

6. NPT. Japan, having signed but not ratified the NPT, is reportedly waiting for EURATOM to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, after which Japan will seek an agreement of its own under which the safeguards requirements will be no more burdensome on Japanese than on European industry. There have, however, been a disturbing number

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or reports to the effect that government officials believe the U. S. has lost interest in the NPT and is indifferent to whether Japan signs or not.

- Express the views of the Administration on the NPT: we signed it; we favor it; we favor other countries accepting it; but we believe that others should make their own decisions on the grounds that the NPT suits their national interests.
- Note the salutary influence this would have, however, on limiting the international arms race. It would also tend to defuse Chinese suspicions of Japanese militarism.
- Reassure Sato that our security commitment to Japan will remain firm, and will serve as an adequate deterrent against all threats to Japan.

Grace Notes

- Okinawa. Congratulate Sato on achieving a major goal in Okinawa Reversion and express appreciation that this was accomplished in ways that do not impair our mutual interests.
- Succession. Express appreciation of Sato's almost eight years of leadership of Japan in close association with the U. S. Acknowledge rumors of his pending resignation as President of the LDP. Express the hope that should he choose to leave

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his high office now or later, he will remain an active influence in Japanese political life and that he and his successor will continue to support the close association between our two countries. (This may elicit some comment on the timing and outcome of the succession struggle.)

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Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda

Fukuda is reportedly highly sensitive to any circumstance that might adversely affect his ambitions to succeed Sato. Conversely, he would be eager to utilize any development that might improve those chances or garner him favorable publicity. Of all Japanese politicians, he has been among the least flexible on the China issue in public utterances. On relations with the U.S., he has responded to heavy Diet pressure to be tough with the Americans on a wide range of issues, especially involving Vietnam and prior consultation. This is a standard GOJ tactic, however, and one that should not disturb us unduly.

The press in particular will be watching avidly for any hint as to whether we favor Fukuda or Tanaka in the succession struggle. You should let your meeting with Fukuda determine how long your meeting with Tanaka should last and the kind of frills -- photographs, press treatment and the like -- that should accompany it. In Japanese terms, you have no counterpart in the GOJ but most of your functions -- to the extent they exist -- are performed by the Foreign Minister and his staff, and Fukuda is Tanaka's senior in every respect. For these reasons it would be natural that your discussion with Fukuda should be longer and wider-ranging than with Tanaka, whereas if the opposite were the case, it would excite considerable speculation.

While Fukuda heads his own faction, his views and political antecedents are much like Sato's. He is a product of the bureaucracy, and he made his deepest impact as Finance Minister, a position he occupied twice. Basically, his interests will coincide with Sato's and you should deal with him on China, the Soviet Union, Korea, Vietnam, multipolarity and the NPT in the same way you do with Sato. In addition, Fukuda may also raise the questions of residual problems related to Okinawan Reversion, the territorial dispute over the Senkakus Islands, and a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council; and we have included talking points on these below.

1. China. Like Sato, Fukuda will focus primarily on China policy, how we envisage the development of our relationship with Peking, what our intentions are toward Taiwan, and what transpired during the President's visit to Peking. He will want to obtain a feeling for what

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it is like to deal directly with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung and for the general atmospherics of Peking. He will be particularly concerned to hear from you whether the conversations in Peking included any mention of matters of great concern to Japan, such as the Senkakus problem, the U. S. -Japan security relationship, Chinese fears of Japanese militarism, and Chinese attitudes toward dealing with the Japanese government.

- Express regret (this word is important -- it implies no blame, but rather an understanding of their problem) that our need for secrecy did not permit us to consult with the Japanese before the July 15 announcement, and our understanding of the political problems the China issue has caused the Sato Government.
- Assure Fukuda that our China initiative is not an attempt to play Japan and China off against each other in balance of power politics, and that we are in no way trading our alliance with Japan off against a hope for a limited improvement in relations with China.
- Assure him we wish to avoid conflict in our approaches to Peking and intend to consult closely on future steps and developments.
- Assure him that no deals were reached on the Senkakus, offshore oil, security issues, or any other subject of concern to Japan, and that we will not take any actions to undercut Japan's vital interests.

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- Explain the Shanghai Communique, especially the sections on Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.
- Describe the atmospherics of Peking, and emphasize the need for firmness in dealing with PRC leaders. (We suspect that the Sato Government's repeated entreaties to Peking for direct official contacts, while perhaps useful to Sato in Japanese domestic politics, have increased PRC leverage on the Sato Government.)
- Draw him out on the status of Japan's efforts to establish contacts with Peking, the results of Miki's recent visit there, and Japan's intentions.
- Indicate that while you recognize the importance of China policy to Japan, particularly at this point, and while we fully intend to coordinate closely on this question, you believe that we must not allow China to obscure other important aspects of our relationship.

2. Soviet Affairs. Like Sato, Fukuda will be particularly interested in a final run-down of the Moscow trip.

- Brief him to the fullest extent possible on the President's Moscow trip and on the agreements reached there.

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- Give him your assessment of Moscow's intentions regarding regional security arrangements, in both Europe and Asia.
- Give Fukuda your assessment of Sino-Soviet relations.
- Draw him out on his own estimate of the prospects for negotiations for a Peace Treaty with the Soviets this fall, for settlement of the Northern Territories issue, and for conclusion of a loan agreement to finance the pipeline from the Tyumen oil field to the Pacific Coast. If asked, tell Fukuda the U. S. Government has put no obstacles in the path of private American participation in the Tyumen oil project and some U. S. oil companies and construction firms are in contact with their Japanese counterparts.

3. Korea. Given Japan's security and economic stake in the Korean Peninsula, Fukuda, like Sato, will be interested, first, in the U. S. 's continued avowal of its defense commitment to and intention to maintain a troop presence in South Korea; second, in our assessment of the tentative moves by Seoul and Pyongyang toward some modus vivendi on the Peninsula; third, in how we plan to approach the Korean question in next fall's U. N. General Assembly; and, fourth, in our views on Japan's increasing contacts with North Korea and our plans for any possible contacts with the North.

- We will stand behind our defense commitment to the ROK, and do not intend to reduce our forces there further in the foreseeable future.

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- We will support the efforts of the ROK to seek a relaxation of tensions and increased communication on the Korean Peninsula.
- We welcome the direct discussion between North and South Korea as what we hope will be the beginning of a long-term process of relaxation of tensions between the two.
- We believe it is too early to conclude that Pyongyang has firmly committed itself to long-term peaceful accommodation with Seoul, and it is necessary to know to what extent Peking and Moscow can and will restrain Pyongyang. Therefore, we should move cautiously.
- We should also avoid those moves that could seriously undermine political cohesion in South Korea, or could help Pyongyang drive wedges between South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.
- We are presently exploring strategy and tactics on the Korean question in next fall's U.N. General Assembly, and are coordinating with ROK, Japan, and others. Postponement of the question this year as last would have the advantage of not undercutting the Seoul-Pyongyang talks and injecting another irritant into our relations with Peking and Moscow. But we must also consider fallback positions.

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4. Vietnam and the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty. The use of U. S. bases in Japan to repair and supply materiel intended for the GVN forces, and the recent dispatch of a Marine air wing from Iwakuni to Vietnam has given the political opposition in Japan an opportunity to attempt to embarrass the government for its support of our Vietnam effort, focussing particularly on the "prior consultation" provisions of our Security Treaty with Japan.

- Express appreciation for the understanding and support of the Japanese Government for our efforts in Vietnam over the years, and particularly following the President's May 8 speech.
- Express gratitude for the Japanese Government's cooperation in the use of bases in Japan in indirect support of our operations in Vietnam during the current North Vietnamese offensive.
(This should be expressed privately only to Sato and Fukuda.)
- If Fukuda raises the question of prior consultation on U. S. use of bases in Japan, you should assure him that the U. S. will not take any action regarding the Vietnam conflict that would require prior consultation, and that we will continue to inform his government in advance of any significant movements that might affect U. S. units in Japan. If asked about reviewing prior consultation arrangements, you should say that we should think carefully before making substantial changes in a system that has worked so well for so long.

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- Give him your estimate of the military and political situation in the South and the ability of the North Vietnamese to maintain the level of their offensive, and explain the necessity for the moves against North Vietnam which the President announced on May 8.
- Give him your estimate of the roles played by the Soviets and Chinese in this action.

5. The Multipolar World. Fukuda's views on Japan's role in a multipolar world appear to be close to those of Sato. Fukuda does not seem to relish the idea of a much more independent Japan maneuvering in a world having a congeries of power centers. Like Sato, he is presently groping for what role Japan might play in such a world, probably would prefer the greater security afforded by a continued close association with the U. S. in which Japan would enjoy most of the forms of equality and a fair degree of flexibility but in which it would in fact remain clearly the junior partner.

- Describe in general terms how you see the multipolar world emerging over the next decade, stressing Asia. What we want to see is a relationship of equals, and not the perpetuation of traditional balance of power concepts.
- Reassure Fukuda that the U. S. fully intends to play an effective role as a power in Asia and the Pacific over the long term, and that we will maintain the balance of ground, naval, and air forces necessary to do this.

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-- Use this as an opportunity to assure Fukuda of the importance we place on maintaining our close ties with Japan, and that we will not sacrifice our essential relationship with Japan for other goals.

-- Explain that the U. S. interest in adjusting the basic relationship with Japan toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is aimed at putting our alliance on a more sustainable basis over the long term.

6. NPT. Japan, having signed but not ratified the NPT, is reportedly waiting for EURATOM to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, after which Japan will seek an agreement of its own under which the safeguards requirements will be no more burdensome on Japanese than on European industry. There have, however, been a disturbing number of reports to the effect that government officials believe the U. S. has lost interest in the NPT and is indifferent to whether Japan signs or not.

-- Express the views of the Administration on the NPT: we signed it and we favor it; we favor other countries accepting it; but we believe that others should make their own decisions on the grounds that the NPT suits their national interests.

-- Note the salutary influence this would have, however, on the international arms race. It would also tend to defuse Chinese suspicions of Japanese militarism.

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7. Okinawa Reversion. Fukuda played a key but little publicized role in the Okinawa reversion negotiations. As Finance Minister, he and Ambassador Kennedy, who as Secretary of the Treasury was Fukuda's counterpart when the negotiations began, worked out the basic financial arrangement.

As Foreign Minister since shortly after it was signed, Fukuda has had to defend the agreement in the Diet and is accordingly intimately familiar with the details of the difficulties which remain. He may well raise one or more reversion-related issues and may possibly remind you of the Japanese request at San Clemente that we enter into early discussions regarding further reduction of U.S. base areas in Okinawa. The Japanese at that time had in mind the release of the Awase Golf Course and Yaka Beach.

-- Assure him subject he has raised will be given serious consideration within USG.

-- State that we will do what we can to accommodate urgent Japanese requirements, but that whatever problem we are discussing -- P-3's, removal of nuclear weapons, claims, etc. -- there are equally strong inhibitions on our actions.

-- If Awase Golf Course and Yaka Beach are raised, suggest that the Japanese discuss this through regular channels and that you will ensure that the appropriate U.S. officials are properly informed of the nature of the San Clemente discussion.

8. Senkakus. Fukuda is more likely than Sato to raise this specific Okinawa-related issue, and perhaps to complain about our half-hearted support of the Japanese position. We desire to avoid public involvement in any dispute.

-- Reaffirm our position that in returning administrative rights to the Senkakus to Japan, we neither add to nor detract from Japan's claim to sovereignty as it existed in 1945.

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- State that we can take no position on the claims by any party regarding the factors affecting earlier claims to sovereignty or the means by which sovereignty was acquired.
- If Fukuda asks, acknowledge that the language of the Security Treaty, which applies "to territories under the administration of Japan," could be interpreted to apply to the Senkakus in the post-reversion period.

9. Security Council Seat for Japan. The Japanese have informed us that they intend to campaign hard to obtain a permanent seat on the U. N. Security Council. Some officials are said to feel that we are opposed to this.

- Acknowledge the reasons (economic power, heavy U. N. assessment, size and influence, potential future growth) why Japan's claim to major power status by this means is valid.
- Say we would support Japan's claim as a matter of principle and would be interested to hear how Japan feels membership might be achieved in the face of the problems associated with charter revision, the size of the Council, and the veto.

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LDP Leaders Kosaka, Mizuta and Nakasone

This group comprises a senior minister and two of the three chief officials (after Sato) of the LDP. Mizuta, currently Finance Minister, is a conservative and heads his own small faction. Kosaka, a former Foreign Minister, is a member of Ohira's faction and is currently head of the LDP's Policy Board. Nakasone (your former student), who leads his own large anti-Mainstream faction, is chairman of the Party's Executive Committee. An opportunist and sensitive to the winds of political change, he is undecided as to whether his Prime Ministerial ambitions can best be satisfied by affiliation with the Mainstream or by pursuit of China's blessing on his own. Dynamic and possessing something akin to what Americans think of as charisma, Nakasone is a nationalist, and as Defense Minister several years ago enunciated the doctrine of self-reliance for Japan in military hardware. Most Americans respond well to his personality and end up with an exaggerated estimate of his chances to become Prime Minister.

Suggested Talking Points

1. China Policy

-- Express regret (this word is important--it implies no blame, but only an understanding of this problem) that our need for secrecy did not permit us to consult with the Japanese Government before the July 15 announcement, and indicate understanding of the political problems caused for the LDP leadership.

-- Assure them we wish to minimize conflict in our approaches to Peking, and intend to consult closely on future steps and developments.

-- Describe the atmospherics of your meetings in Peking with Mao and Chou.

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- Explain the Shanghai Communique, especially the sections on Japan and on the Taiwan problem.
- Describe our policy toward Taiwan, especially the importance we place on its continued economic viability and that it not be isolated internationally.
- Draw them out on the status of Japan's efforts to establish contacts with Peking, and how they believe Japanese investment in Taiwan can be protected over the long term.
- Ask their opinions as to possible points of friction in our approaches to China, and how we can best prevent the Chinese from playing the U.S. and Japan off against each other.

2. Policy Toward the Soviet Union

- Give them your general assessment of the Moscow summit, and discuss what you believe to be Soviet intentions regarding Japan and China.
- Stress that the SALT agreement is the kind of progress on arms control by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for which Japan expressed a desire when they signed the NPT.
- Ask them what they foresee in terms of future Japanese-Soviet relations, the prospects for a peace treaty, and possible U.S. -Japan joint ventures in Siberia.

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-- Assure them that the U.S. supports Japanese claims to the Northern Territories.

3. Vietnam

-- Give them a current assessment of the situation in Vietnam, as well as any insight you may have as to the intentions of the Hanoi leadership.

4. The Emerging Order

-- Describe how you see the world after the Peking and Moscow summits, especially in Asia and with special reference to the U.S. - Japan relationship and multipolarity.

-- Reassure them that our security commitment to Japan remains firm, and that we do not expect Japan to undertake military commitments beyond its own borders.

-- Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is aimed at making our alliance more sustainable over the long term, and is in no way a subterfuge for pressing Japan to stand by itself.

-- Reassure the group that the U.S. intends to play a vital balancing role in Asia, and will maintain the mix of ground, naval, and air forces in the area necessary to make that role effective.

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Meeting With Senior News Editors

The media organizations represented at this meeting cover the spectrum in Japan. Yomiuri and Asahi are probably the most stridently anti-establishment, anti-government and, given the government's close ties with the U.S., are the least sympathetic to the U.S., particularly on Vietnam and the U.S.-Japan security tie. Sankei in the past year or two has changed from its earlier pro-U.S. bias. At the other end of the spectrum is the pro-government Japan Times, which because it publishes only an English-language edition is of relatively small influence. (Several others such as Mainichi and Yomiuri also publish English-language editions, but these are quite different in news and editorial content than their Japanese-language editions.) Also included in this group is Japan's leading news commentator, Mr. Ogata. Speaking most generally, however, Japanese media tend to be heavily critical of the Liberal Democratic Governments, and usually of the U.S. as well.

You can expect a sharply probing, well-informed reception, and what they write will probably be balanced toward the negative side. They will almost certainly press for the content of your discussions with Sato and Fukuda, but will also be particularly interested in your global and regional perspectives, China and its relationship with the Soviet Union, and how you see Japan relating to all of this.

Your Talking Points

-- Outline your views of the emerging multipolar system in Asia and the world, and in what manner Japan might relate to this evolving order.

-- Reassure the group that the U.S. continues to attach the highest value to its alliance with Japan, intends to stand by its defense commitment to Japan, and sees no contradiction between these intentions and the U.S. effort to improve relations with the PRC.

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-- Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship with Japan toward greater equality and reciprocity is directed toward making our alliance more sustainable over the long haul.

-- Reassure the group that the U.S. firmly intends to stay in Asia and the Pacific to play a balancing role, and will retain a mix of forces required to make this role effective.

-- Explain the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, particularly our response to the current North Vietnamese offensive.

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SENIOR EDITORS

Sunday, June 11, 1972

Mr. Motoo Goto, Managing Editor, Asahi Press

Mr. Shinji Sakai, Managing Editor, Kyodo Press

Mr. Teruumi Nagata, Executive Director, Sankei Press

Mr. Johei Tachibana, Managing Editor, Jiji Press

Mr. Kiyooki Murata, Managing Editor, Japan Times

Mr. Ichiro Hotta, Managing Editor of Tokyo Hdqs. Chunichi Press

Mr. Yasuo Takeyama, Director, Chief Editor & Chief Editorial
Writer, Nihon Keizai Press

Mr. Akira Ogata, Chief Commentator, NHK

Mr. Eiichi Saito, Chief Editor, Mainichi Press

Mr. Tsutomu Shiragami, Chief Editorial Writer, Yomiuri Press

Mr. Kazushige Hirasawa, Former Editor Japan Time, & NHK
Commentator

Mr. Goro Fujise, NHK

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Socialist Party Leaders

It is only recently with the emergence of some good younger people in the Japanese Socialist Party that Americans have found it useful to talk to the Party's leadership. The Party's Secretary General, Mr. Ishibashi, is one of the more worthwhile Socialists, and has a broader world view than almost any of the others because of his years as head of the Party's international section. In the presence of the Party Chairman, Mr. Narita, however, it is unlikely that he will speak up in any spontaneous way. Narita himself has always appeared to be the hide-bound Marxist ideologue and he has occasionally lectured visiting Americans on our ideological sins. His Party has been too distressed by internal wrangling to serve as any kind of a threat -- beyond harassment -- to the LDP. It is unlikely they will be much interested in economic affairs.

Suggested Talking Points

-- Outline your views on the emerging multipolar system in Asia, and in what ways Japan might relate to this evolving international order.

-- Reassure the group that the U.S. continue to attach the highest value to its alliance with Japan, intends to stand by its defense commitment to Japan, and sees no contradiction between these intentions and the U.S. effort to improve relations with the PRC.

-- Reassure the group that the U.S. intends to continue to play a vital balancing role in Asia, and will maintain the mix of forces required to make that role effective.

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-- Explain the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, particularly our response to the current North Vietnamese offensive.

-- To derive the full flavor from this conversation, draw Mr. Narita out as regards Japan's domestic political situation, the U.S. -Japan relationship, and Japan's future role in Asia and the world.

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Meeting With Former Foreign Ministers: Miki, Fujiyama, Aichi, Ohira, Shiina and Kosaka

This meeting will provide you with the opportunity to meet two Prime Ministerial aspirants, Ohira and Miki. Ohira heads the fairly strong faction he inherited from former Prime Minister Ikeda, which places him in the LDP Mainstream, though not in its inner circles. Recent reports indicate that he will throw his weight behind Tanaka's candidacy, but there is still an outside chance that Ohira might emerge as a dark horse candidate if, as seems quite possible, the first ballot at the Party Convention produces a deadlock. A more likely outcome is that he would be Foreign Minister to Tanaka should he win. Less aggressive than Tanaka or Fukuda, Ohira is skilled in the art of Japanese-style consensual politics. As Foreign Minister in 1963-66, he was in his dealings with the U.S. Government consistently a reliable, cooperative counterpart.

Miki, who was Sato's Foreign Minister during the period when the Korean agreement was worked out and the discussion on Okinawa Reversion began, heads his own faction. A perennial candidate, he ran against Sato in the last two party elections. As a leader of the anti-Mainstream group within the LDP, he is less committed to the alliance with the U.S. and more inclined toward independent initiatives than the heretofore predominant Mainstreamers.

The others are less important. You will already have met Kosaka at the luncheon with the LDP executives; he is an Ohira faction man, whose position as LDP Policy Board Chairman is due more to his standing within the Ohira faction than to his own abilities. He is, however, friendly to Americans. Aichi, a very decent man, is a faithful Sato follower. His work in negotiating the Okinawa Treaty with us has been appreciated by both governments, although he lost considerable face over his Ministry's failure to anticipate our China initiative. Fujiyama, who negotiated the Security Treaty with us as Kishi's Foreign Minister, has since turned against the Kishi-Sato line, and has attempted to create a position for himself as the best LDP connection to Peking. The Chinese, however, have a clear view of his influence and are apparently only stringing him along. Shiina, a workman-like Foreign Minister well liked by the Foreign Ministry professionals, is not a prominent factor in LDP politics.

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Of this group, Fujiyama and Miki have recently been to Peking, and both advocate acceptance of Peking's conditions for a discussion of normalization of relations. These men should be approached on about the same basis as the Mizuta-Kosaka-Nakasone group.

Suggested Talking Points

1. China Policy

- Express regret (this word is important) that our need for secrecy did not permit us to consult with the Japanese Government before the July 15 announcement, and indicate understanding of the political problems caused for the LDP leadership.
- Assure them we wish to minimize any conflict in our approaches to Peking and intend to consult closely on future steps and developments.
- Describe the atmospherics of your meetings in Peking with Mao and Chou.
- Explain the Shanghai Communiqué, especially the section of Japan and Taiwan.
- Describe our policy toward Taiwan, especially the importance we place on its continued economic viability and that it not be isolated internationally.

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-- Draw them out on the status of Japan's efforts to establish contacts with Peking, and how they believe Japanese investment in Taiwan can be protected over the long term.

-- Ask their opinions as to possible points of friction in our approaches to China, and how we can best prevent the Chinese from playing the U.S. and Japan off against each other.

2. Policy Toward the Soviet Union

-- Give them your general assessment of the Moscow summit and discuss what you believe to be Soviet intentions regarding Japan and China.

-- Stress that the SALT agreement is the kind of progress on arms control by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for which the Japanese expressed a desire when they signed the NPT.

-- Ask them what they foresee in terms of future Japanese-Soviet relations, the prospects for a peace treaty and possible U.S. -Japan joint ventures in Siberia.

-- Assure them that the U.S. supports Japanese claims to the Northern Territories.

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3. Vietnam

-- Give them a current assessment of the situation in Vietnam as well as any insight you may have as to the intentions of the Hanoi leadership.

4. The Emerging Order

-- Describe how you see the world after the Peking and Moscow summits, especially in Asia and with special reference to the U.S. - Japan relationship and multipolarity.

-- Reassure them that our security commitment to Japan remains firm and that we do not expect Japan to undertake military commitments beyond its own borders.

-- Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is aimed at making our alliance more sustainable over the long term, and is not a formula for pressing to attenuate its ties with us and to stand by itself.

-- Reassure the group that the U.S. intends to play a balancing role in Asia, and will retain the mix of forces in the area required to make that role effective.

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Minister of International Trade and Industry

Kakuei Tanaka

The rough-hewn Tanaka is running hard for the Prime Ministership. The Japanese press will assess your meeting with him as an effort to size him up as a potential Prime Minister and will be eager for any hint of the outcome of your discussion as it bears on this situation. Tanaka will have difficulty resisting the temptation to exploit this to his own advantage. He is a member of Sato's own political faction and should Sato step aside, Tanaka would contest with former Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori for control of it.

Tanaka alone of Mainstream LDP politicians has avoided close contact with Americans, and his views on our security relationship, on Chinese affairs and on other matters of major concern are not well known. Tanaka is the quintessential political tactician. He had his greatest impression as Secretary General of the LDP during the 1965-66 and 1968-71 periods, and his stock with Sato has risen recently because he has successfully undertaken several tough jobs for Sato (the textile agreement with us and settlement of the defense budget squabble in the Diet) at considerable risk to his own prestige.

Tanaka like to project the image of a youthful, vigorous defender of Japan's interests. Possessed of a considerable ego, he is very publicity conscious. Be certain to agree with him in advance on what may or may not be said to the press.

1. Major Political and Security Issues

Tanaka will probably be less interested and informed than Sato and Fukuda on the Chinese, Soviet, and other major international issues, but will nonetheless want to discuss them with you. Given our relative lack of knowledge of his views in this area, you should try to draw him out on these problems.

A. China

- We regret (in the Japanese context the term implies no admission of guilt, but only an understanding of their problem) that our need for secrecy did not permit us to consult with Japan before the

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July 15 announcement, and our understanding of the political problems the China issue has caused the Sato Government.

- Our China initiative is not an attempt to play Japan off against China.
- We wish to avoid conflict in our approaches to Peking, and intend to consult closely on future steps and developments.
- We made no secret deals during the China trip, and we took no actions that compromise Japan's basic interests.
- Explain the Shanghai Communique, especially the sections on Japan, Taiwan, and Korea.
- While we recognize the importance of China policy to Japan, particularly at this point, and while we fully intend to consult closely on this question, you believe that we must not allow China to obscure other important aspects of our relationship.

B. Soviet Union.

- Review for Tanaka the President's Moscow visit and the agreements reached there.
- Give Tanaka your assessment of Moscow's intentions regarding regional security arrangements, both in Europe and Asia.
- Give Tanaka your assessment of Sino-Soviet relations.

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C. Korea

- We will stand behind our defense commitment to the ROK, and do not intend to reduce our forces there further in the foreseeable future.
- We will support the efforts of the ROK to seek a relaxation of tensions and increased communication on the Korean Peninsula.
- We welcome the direct discussion between North and South Korea as what we hope will be the beginning of a long-term process of relaxation of tensions between the two.
- We believe it is too early to conclude that Pyongyang has firmly committed itself to long-term peaceful accommodation with Seoul, and to know to what extent Peking and Moscow can and will restrain Pyongyang if necessary. Therefore, we should move cautiously.
- We should also avoid those moves that could seriously undermine political cohesion in South Korea, or could help Pyongyang drive wedges between South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.
- We are presently exploring strategy and tactics on the Korean question in next fall's UN General Assembly, and are coordinating with ROK, Japan and others. Postponement of the question this

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year as last would have the advantage of not undercutting the Seoul-Pyongyang talks and injecting another irritant into our relations with Peking and Moscow. But we must also consider fallback positions.

D. Vietnam

- Express appreciation for the understanding and support of the Japanese Government for our efforts in Vietnam over the years, and particularly following the President's May 8 speech.
- Give Tanaka the rationale for the basic U.S. commitment in Vietnam, as well as that for our response to the current North Vietnamese offensive, stressing the position articulated in the President's May 8 speech.

E. The Multipolar World

- Describe in general terms how you see the multipolar world emerging in the next decade, stressing Asia. What we hope to see is a relationship of equals, and not the perpetuation of traditional balance of power concepts.
- Reassure Tanaka that the U.S. fully intends to play an effective role as a power in Asia and the Pacific over the long term, and that we will maintain the balance of ground, naval, and air forces necessary to do this.

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- Assure Tanaka of the importance we attach to maintaining our close ties with Japan.
- Explain to Tanaka the vital role we believe Japan can play in Asia, particularly as regards economic and technical development, but also in Asia's political councils. (Specifying the roles we envisage for Japan as essential, inasmuch as some Japanese believe that what they see as our failure to do so in the past year indicates that we are encouraging Japan to move toward a regional security role in Asia.)
- Explain that the U. S. interest in adjusting the basic relationship with Japan toward greater equality, inter-dependence, and reciprocity is aimed at putting our alliance on a more sustainable basis over the long term.

F. NPT

- Express the views of the Administration on the NPT: we signed it and we favor it; we favor other countries accepting it; but we believe that others should make their own decisions on the grounds that the NPT suits their national interests.
- Note the salutary influence this would have, however, on limiting the international arms race. It would also tend to defuse Chinese suspicions of Japanese militarism.

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- Reassure Tanaka that our security commitment to Japan will remain firm, and will serve as an adequate deterrent against all threats to Japan.

2. U. S. Japan Bilateral Economic Issues

Tanaka will expect you to review economic issues in a general way with him, and it would seem strange to him if you did not.

- The U. S. intends to pursue its effort to persuade Japan to remove trade barriers, particularly quotas illegal (under the GATT), both through diplomatic channels, and in the GATT.
- Although Japan has made considerable progress in liberalizing inward investments, we would hope that the GOJ will permit full foreign capital participation in all Japanese industries.
- We welcome Japan's cooperation in examining and formulating recommendations for revising the international monetary system.
- The U. S. is mounting a major effort to promote U. S. exports, and we would believe that it is important that the Government of Japan assist us in increasing our exports to Japan.
- The U. S. is controlling its inflation, and thus is gradually recovering the stability essential to the world trading system. Japan's cooperation is appreciated.

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University Professors

This group represents Japan's leading commentators on domestic politics, security problems and international relations. While most of the people on this list are basically conservative in outlook, their views cover a wide political spectrum. They are listed as academics, which is true enough, but it should be recognized that Japanese professors contribute widely to the public print. Unless clearly enjoined from doing so, virtually every one on this list will feel impelled to publish something about this meeting. China and U.S. -Japan relations, especially the security area, will be the fields of specific interest.

Suggested Talking Points

-- Outline your views of the emerging multipolar system in Asia and the world, and in what manner Japan might relate to this evolving order.

-- Reassure the group that the U.S. continues to attach the highest value to its alliance with Japan, intends to stand by its defense commitment to Japan, and sees no contradiction between these intentions and the U.S. effort to improve relations with the PRC.

-- Explain that the U.S. interest in adjusting our basic relationship with Japan toward greater equality and reciprocity is directed toward making our alliance more sustainable over the long haul.

-- Reassure the group that the U.S. firmly intends to stay in Asia and the Pacific to play a balancing role, and will retain a mix of forces required to make this role effective.

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-- Explain the U.S. commitment to Vietnam, particularly our response to the current North Vietnamese offensive.

-- Tell them that you well understand Japan's reasons for not undertaking a military role beyond its borders, and the dangers of an independent Japanese nuclear capability.

-- Ask them for their views on U.S.-Japan economic problems.

-- Ask them for their suggestions on how American studies in Japan might be improved.

-- Express regret that your present responsibilities do not permit you more time to meet and exchange views with intellectuals in Japan.

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UNIVERSITY PROFESSORSLuncheon -- June 12, 1972

(in alphabetical order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>
Shinkichi ETOH	Professor	University of Tokyo (China exp.)
Shinpei FUJIMAKI	Assistant Professor	Tokai University
Tadao ISHIKAWA	Professor	Keio University (China expert)
Fuji KAMIYA	Professor	Keio University
Masanori KIKUCHI	Assistant Professor	University of Tokyo (Soviet exp.)
Masataka KOHSAKA	Professor	Kyoto University
Yohnosuke NAGAI	Professor	Tokyo Institute of Technology
Mineo NAKAJIMA	Assistant Professor	Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (China expert)
Michio ROHYAMA	Professor	Sophia University
Takashi SAITOH	Professor	Gakushuin University
Yoshikazu SAKAMOTO	Professor	University of Tokyo
Hiroharu SEKI	Professor	University of Tokyo
Hayao SHIMIZU	Lecturer	Meiji University (Soviet expert)
Hajime TERASAWA	Professor	University of Tokyo
Kei WAKAIZUMI	Representative	Tokyo Office of Kyoto Sangyo University

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